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 1. GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 Steps to regulate surrogacy in South Africa predate the advent of democracy. 
In 1987, in a much publicised case, Karen Ferreira Jorge gave birth to triplets, 
born of the gametes of her daughter (she was the gestational mother and the 
biological grandmother). At the time there was no legal regulation for this 
unprecedented state of events, leading to a project committee of the South 
African Law Commission (now the South African Law Reform Commission 
(hereaft er  ‘ SALRC ’ ) being appointed to investigate the issue. Although this 
Committee had completed its work in the 1990s, 1 there was no further legislative 
action (notwithstanding a post-1994 Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee being 
convened to conduct public hearings on surrogacy) to fi nalise new laws. 
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 2  R 175 of Government Gazette no. 1165 of 20.09.2016, read together with R 175 of Government 
Gazette no. 35099 of 12.03.2012. 
 3  Act 61 of 2003. Section 296(2) of the Children ’ s Act provides that the fertilisation of any 
person in consequence of the confi rmation of a surrogate agreement must be eff ected in 
terms of these regulations. 
 4  See the stringent requirements for papers laid down in the fi rst reported surrogacy matter, 
 Ex Parte WH and others  2011  (6) SA 514 . 
Ultimately surrogacy was added as a fi nal chapter to the Children ’ s Act 37 of 
2005, which came fully into force in April 2010. Th e project committee which 
had deliberated upon the development of the omnibus Children ’ s Act had not 
considered surrogacy during its lifespan, so the impetus to add surrogacy to the 
Children ’ s Act came from within the SALRC. Th e initial work of the SALRC 
has survived, and many of the current provisions can be traced to the original 
report. Th e location of regulations on surrogacy within the overarching tenets 
of the Children ’ s Act has, however, shaped the current interpretation of the 
provisions, as will be shown below. By way of a preliminary point, the Act allows 
only altruistic surrogacy: commercial surrogacy is barred. 
 South Africa stands out for its progressive constitution, with two particular 
clauses worthy of discussion. First, s. 28 provides a mini charter of children ’ s 
rights, including the injunction that the best interests of the child are of paramount 
concern in all matters aff ecting the child. As a justiciable constitutional right, 
the best interests provision has provided an important standard which has at 
times been overriding. Second, South Africa ’ s equality clause (s. 9) prohibits 
discrimination on a wide range of bases, including gender, marital status and 
sexual orientation. All have proved to be relevant in the context of surrogacy, 
which is equally available to hetero and same-sex couples. 
 Apart from the Children ’ s Act, of added relevance are the Regulations 
Relating to the Artifi cial Fertilisation of Persons 2 promulgated by the Minister 
of Health under the Health Act 2003. 3 
 Th ere are no available statistics to indicate how many surrogacy agreements 
are concluded annually in the country. Since the Children ’ s Act requires 
confi rmation of surrogacy agreement prior to fertilisation of the surrogate by a 
High Court, of which there are more than 12 in the country, it could be possible 
to establish a quantum, but that would require perusal of the documents at each 
court. Since fertility clinics are mainly in private hands, data from that source is 
not available either. 
 However, both the requirement of a written agreement, which would 
necessarily be prepared by an attorney, 4 and the requirement of a High Court 
application which is costly, means that generally surrogacy will be the preserve 
of the middle and upper classes, and fi gures are estimated to be fairly low (in the 




 5  Section 292(1)(a). 
 6  Th ere have been concerns expressed that South Africa may have been or be a destination 
for international surrogacy as in an early case, the commissioning fathers were respectively 
a Danish and Dutch citizens; however they alleged they were domiciled in South Africa. 
See  Ex Parte WH and others  2011  (6) SA 514 (GNP) and  J.  Heaton ,  ‘ Th e pitfalls of international 
surrogacy: A South African family law perspective ’ ( 2015 )  74  THRHR  24 . 
 7  Section 292(1)(c) and (d). Th e domicile requirement pertaining to the surrogate may be 
waived by a High Court on reasonable cause shown, e.g. if the intended surrogate is a relative 
living abroad. 
 8  Section 293(1) and (2). If the husband or partner of the surrogate who is not genetically 
related to the child to be born unreasonably withholds consent, his consent may be dispensed 
with by a court. 
 9  Section 1 of the Children ’ s Act 38 of 2005 defi nes a gamete as  ‘ either of the two generative cells 
essential for human reproduction. ’ 
 2. SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS IN GENERAL 
 With the coming into force of Chapter 20 of the Children ’ s Act, surrogacy 
agreements acquired legal validity, provided that the various requirements 
established by the Act are met. First, the agreement must be in writing, and 
signed by all the parties. 5 Of primary importance is that only non-commercial 
surrogacy (altruistic) is permitted, as will be further detailed below. 
 Th e contractual agreement must be entered into in South Africa, and at 
least one of the commissioning parents, or where the commissioning parent 
is a single person, that person, must be domiciled in South Africa. 6 So, too, 
the surrogate and her husband or partner, if any, must be domiciled in South 
Africa at the time of entering into the agreement. 7 Th e intention of the legislator 
was clearly to prevent South Africa from becoming an international surrogacy 
destination. 
 Further, where a commissioning parent is married or is involved in a 
permanent relationship, a court may not confi rm an agreement unless that 
husband, wife or partner gives consent to the agreement and becomes party to 
it. Similarly, the husband or partner of the surrogate must consent and become 
party to the agreement. 8 
 Before proceeding to detail the requirements of s. 294, s. 295 provides what 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa has termed the  ‘ threshold requirement ’. 
Th is entails that the commissioning parent or parents must not be able to give 
birth to a child and that such condition must be permanent and irreversible. 
A person is  ‘ conception infertile ’ if they are unable to contribute a gamete 9 for 
the purposes of conception through artifi cial fertilisation. A person is  ‘ pregnancy 
infertile ’ if they are permanently and irreversibly unable to carry a pregnancy to 
term. In other words, both situations would meet the requirements of s. 295(a) 
of the Children ’ s Act. 
 Section 294 contains the now famous genetic link requirement: no surrogacy 
agreement is valid unless the child whose conception is contemplated in the 
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 10  AB and others v Minister of Social Development and Others (Centre for Child Law intervening 
as Amicus Curiae)  CCT 155/15 , discussed in  S.  Florescu and  J.  Sloth-Nielsen ,  ‘ Visions 
on Surrogacy: From North to South: the approach of the Netherlands and South Africa to 
the issue of surrogacy and the child ’ s right to know his origin ’ [ 2017 ]  International Survey of 
Family Law ,  239 – 58 . 
 11  Th e Minister of Social Development, as the custodian of the Children ’ s Act, opposed the 
application on several grounds, namely that: 
 (a)  It was not only  AB ’ s rights that were at issue, but also those of the child to be created by 
the surrogate mother and donor(s). Th e prospective child had the right to know its genetic 
origins. 
 (b)  Th e adoption process in South Africa catered for  AB ’ s need to have a child. 
 (c)  To allow a single infertile person to create a child with no genetic link to her would result 
in the creation of a  ‘ designer ’ child. Th is would not be in the public interest. 
 (d)  Section 294 assists to prevent commercial surrogacy from taking root. 
agreement is to be eff ected with the gametes of both of the commissioning 
parents, or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other valid 
reasons, the gametes of at least one of them. Th is requirement was the subject 
of protracted litigation, fi nally ending in the Constitutional Court in  AB and 
others v Minister of Social Development and Others (Centre for Child Law 
intervening as Amicus Curiae) in 2016. 10 Upon being advised that, because 
she was unable to provide gametes as a single person, she was ineligible for 
surrogacy, the applicant mounted a constitutional challenge to the validity of 
s. 294, arguing that the genetic link requirement violated her rights to equal 
treatment, to reproductive autonomy and to dignity (amongst others). Pitted 
against this was the question whether the child ’ s best interests and right to know 
his or her genetic origins outweighed the applicant ’ s claims to the constitutional 
violations alleged. 11 
 In the High Court,  AB was successful, insofar as the judge ruled the  ‘ genetic 
link ’ requirement to be unconstitutional, striking down the impugned section, 
and referring the matter to the Constitutional Court for confi rmation (as required 
by the Constitution). A critical factor which prompted the High Court to declare 
s. 294 provisionally unconstitutional was the diff erentiation in law between the 
use of surrogacy and the use of IVF procedures, as spelt out in the regulations 
to the Health Act (referred to above). Th e IVF regime does not require that the 
parent or parents of a child to be conceived through IVF donate their gametes. 
In the view of the High Court, this amounted to diff erential treatment, even 
though it was conceded that the two procedures  – IVF and surrogacy  – were 
fundamentally diff erent. 
 Th e Constitutional Court reversed the decision of the High Court. Th e 
Constitutional Court regarded it as signifi cant that the impugned provision falls 
under the overarching principles of the Children ’ s Act, such as the principle 
that the best interests of the child must be applied in all decisions taken under 




 12  Th e majority/minority split was 7 - 4. Th e minority also wrote a lengthy judgment (which is 
reproduced fi rst, with the majority following). 
 13  AB and others v Minister of Social Development and Others (Centre for Child Law intervening 
as Amicus Curiae)  CCT 155/15 para. 287, above n. 10. 
 14  Ibid. para. 288. Th e court compares the disqualifi cation of persons unable to donate a gamete 
to those with defective vision (blindness) or uncontrolled epilepsy and uncontrolled diabetes 
mellitus, who are disqualifi ed from obtaining a driver ’ s license. 
 15  Ibid. para. 302. 
 16  Section 41 of the Children ’ s Act provides that a child born as a result of artifi cial fertilisation or 
surrogacy or the guardian of such child is entitled to have access to any medical information 
concerning that child ’ s genetic parents and to any other information concerning the child ’ s 
genetic parent but not before the child reaches the age of 18 years. Subsection 41(2) provides 
however, that information disclosed as set out here may not reveal the identity of the person 
whose gamete was or gametes were used for the artifi cial insemination of the identity of the 
surrogate mother. 
 17  ‘ Th e Right to Know One ’ s Own Biological Origins ’  South African Law Reform Commission 
Issue paper 32, Project 40 ,  20.05.2017 . Th e Issue paper expresses the concern that the 
majority 12 affi  rmed that mere diff erentiation does not necessarily amount to 
 ‘ irrational ’ discrimination; moreover, IVF and surrogacy were regulated under 
completely diff erent statutes, with diff erent objectives. 
 According to the court,  ‘ [t]he requirement of donor gamete(s) within the 
context of surrogacy indeed serves a rational purpose  – the public good chosen 
by the lawgiver  – of creating a bond between the child and the commissioning 
parents or parent. Th e creation of a bond is designed to protect the best interests 
of the child-to-be born so that the child has a genetic link with its parent(s). 
Th erefore, a rational connection exists. ’ 13 Second, it is rational because it 
safeguards the child ’ s genetic origin, in the best interests of the child, in the view 
of the court. 14 And third, an IVF parent using a double donation gametes would 
have gestational links to the child to be born. 
 Having established the rationality of the provision, the next issue to consider 
was whether it discriminated unfairly against the applicant on the grounds of 
her infertility ? It did not, according to the court.  ‘ Th e parent still has available 
options aff orded by the law: a single parent has the choice to enter into a 
permanent relationship with a fertile parent, thereby qualifying the parent for 
surrogacy. It is therefore the exercise of this personal choice that disqualifi es her, 
not her infertility or the impugned section. ’ 15 Having found no discrimination, 
the court did not need to deal with the question as to whether the discrimination 
was unfair. 
 Th is majority decision has not been welcomed in all quarters, as the reasoning 
of the majority was not entirely convincing. Moreover, the suggestion that the 
infertile applicant fi nd a fertile partner for the purposes of conception with non-
donor gametes does not seem judicious, and smacks of a diff erent form of baby 
shopping. Th e fi nding of the Constitutional Court has, however, lead to a South 
African Law Reform Commission investigation into the rights of children to 
know their biological origins 16 more generally and an Issue paper was released 
on the topic in 2017. 17 
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provision of s. 41 of the Children ’ s Act may, especially in the light of the reasoning in  AB , be 
unconstitutional. 
 18  Section 296 provides emphatically that no artifi cial fertilisation of the surrogate may take 
place before confi rmation of the agreement by a court, or aft er the lapse of 18 months aft er 
confi rmation by a court. 
 19  Ex parte WH and others  2011  (6) SA 514 (GNP) , para. 39. 
 20  Section 295(d). 
 21  Above n. 20. 
 22  Ex parte WH , above n.19, para. 29. 
 Section 295 sets out the requirements for a court to confi rm a surrogacy 
agreement, which are elaborated 18 more closely under Section 4 below, as they 
pertain mainly to the eligibility requirements of for the commissioning parents 
and for the surrogate. Section 295 requires that the agreement contain details 
of the consents, genetic origin of the children, when artifi cial fertilisation will 
take place, termination of the agreement and the eff ect of termination of the 
agreement. 19 Furthermore, the agreement must spell out adequate provisions 
for the care, contact, upbringing and general welfare of the child that is to be 
born in a stable home environment, including the child ’ s position in the event 
of the death of the commissioning parents or one of them, or their divorce or 
separation before the birth of the child. 20 
 Th e bare requirements of the Children ’ s Act in respect of the contents of 
a surrogacy agreement have been supplemented by judicial guidance on the 
contents of surrogacy agreements. Notably, in  Ex parte WH , 21 a case in which 
an agency had facilitated the contact between the commissioning parents and 
the prospective surrogate, the court wanted considerable additional details to 
be fi led on the role of that agency, such as all agreements concluded between 
the commissioning parents, the agency and the surrogate, and details of any 
sums paid by the commissioning parents to the agency. Full details of payments 
made by the agency to the surrogate were also required to be produced. Th e 
court adversely commented on the provision for payment of  ‘ lump sum ’ or 
general amounts under the various categories (health insurance, life insurance, 
surrogate ’ s various expenditure (maternity clothes, transport)) as these could 
disguise the payment of compensation. 22 Th e court must be appraised of any 
previous applications for confi rmation of a surrogacy agreement, in which 
jurisdiction they were brought and whether they were successful or not. 
Proof must be given of police clearance having been obtained, of a report 
from a clinical psychologist for both the surrogate and a separate one for the 
commissioning parents confi rming their suitability, and a medical report in 
respect of the surrogate must be attached. In that jurisdiction (Gauteng North, 
i.e. the Pretoria region), the rules laid down adding requirements to be included 
in confi rmation applications have been supplemented by a Practice Manual 





 23  A draft  Children ’ s Act Amendment Bill, which includes these proposed provisions, was 
issued for public comment during September 2018. 
 24  In respect of legally  invalid surrogacy agreement, the consequences would be that the child is 
for all purposes the child of the surrogate (and her partner, if any) even if there is no genetic 
link to either of them, Conversely, the commissioning parents would have not status as legal 
parents (even in one of them is genetically related to the child): s. 297(2). 
 25  Section 297(1)(e). 
 26  Section 298. 
 Th e Act does not provide for regulations to be promulgated in relation to 
surrogacy. Amendments that have been prepared for the Department of Social 
Development, but which as yet have not been introduced to Parliament, will 
seek to add a provision empowering the Minister to produce regulations, and 
with a view to implementing the requirements added by the court in  Ex parte 
WH , which will probably feature in these Regulations. 23 
 Th e Children ’ s Act creates a number of off ences related to surrogacy. Th ese 
are contained in s. 303. First, no person may fertilise a woman in the execution 
of a surrogate motherhood agreement until the artifi cial fertilisation has been 
authorised by a court in accordance with the Act. Second, no person may in any 
way or with a view to compensation make it known that any person is or might 
be willing to enter into a surrogate motherhood agreement. 
 3. LEGAL PARENTHOOD AT THE TIME OF BIRTH 
 Th e eff ect of a legally valid surrogacy agreement is that the child once born is to 
all intents and for all purposes the child of the commissioning parent(s) from 
birth, according to s. 297(1). 24 Sections 297(b) and (c) provide that the surrogate 
mother must hand over the child as soon as reasonably possible aft er the birth, 
and neither she nor her partner (if any) or relatives will enjoy any legal status in 
respect of the child. Unless specifi ed in the agreement, she will also have no right 
to have contact with the child. In turn, the surrogate-born child will have no 
maintenance or inheritance claim against the surrogate mother or her partner 
or relatives. She may not terminate the agreement once artifi cial fertilisation 
has taken place, 25 subject to her inalienable right to opt for a termination of 
pregnancy (see s. 300). 
 However, a diff erent position prevails if she is genetically related to the child 
(through ovum donation): in this case, she has 60 days aft er the birth of the child to 
terminate the agreement. In this instance, the court must confi rm her withdrawal 
from the contract, and she then incurs no liability to the commissioning parents 
save for the reimbursement of any expenses that they have covered. 26 Th e eff ect, 
according to s. 299, is that where the agreement is terminated aft er the child 
is born, parental rights vest then in the surrogate, her partner or husband, 
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 27  Section 299(a). 
 28  Section 299(b). 
 29  Section 299(d). Th e agreement may also be terminated by the surrogate exercising her right to 
undergo a termination of pregnancy, which is guaranteed under the sexual and reproductive 
autonomy clause of the Constitution and provided for in the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act, 1996. She is required to inform the commissioning parents of her decision 
and to consult with them prior to the termination. 
 30  Section 297(2). 
 31  Section 296. 
 32  2014 (3) SA 415 (GP). 
 33  Pre-confi rmation conception is actually an off ence in terms of s. 301. 
or  if she does not have one, the commissioning father. 27 Where the agreement 
is terminated before the child is born, parental rights vest in the surrogate, her 
husband or partner if any, or if none, the commissioning father as from the time 
of birth. 28 Th e surrogate mother, her husband or partner, or where applicable the 
commissioning father, are obliged to accept the responsibilities of parenthood. 
Subject to the instance that the surrogate has no husband or partner, triggering 
the allocation of parental rights to the commissioning father, the commissioning 
parents in all other instances have no rights towards the surrogate-born child. 29 
 A child born of a surrogacy arrangement which does not comply with the 
requirements of the Act is deemed for all purposes the child of the surrogate and 
not the commissioning parent(s). 30 
 No artifi cial fertilisation of the surrogate may take place before the 
confi rmation of the agreement by a court, or aft er the lapse of 18 months from 
the date of confi rmation. 31 In  Ex parte M and others 32 the court was confronted 
with just such a fait accompli as this section tried to prevent. Th e application 
for confi rmation was made when the surrogate was already 33 weeks 
pregnant. 33 Th e fertilisation had taken place on the basis of a verbal agreement 
between the parties, who had used the father ’ s sperm. Th e questions facing 
the court were twofold: was the court competent to confi rm the agreement 
notwithstanding non-compliance with s. 296 ? And what is to be required in 
cases like the present, i.e. on what basis could the court exercise its discretion 
to confi rm an agreement for which prior authorisation was not obtained ? For 
the record, the pregnancy resulted from the use of a donor egg and sperm from 
the commissioning father. 
 Th e court held that the Act does not clearly state what powers such court 
may have to confi rm ex post facto an agreement, and what the status of such 
agreement (valid or invalid) might be. However, at common law, this would be 
an unlawful agreement, and therefore unenforceable. Courts would normally 
be slow to interpret a statute in such a way as to condone illegality. But, the 
court noted, a surrogacy contract is a contract of a special kind, raising issues 




 34  Case no. 14341/17, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. 
 35  Th is was relevant to the assessment of whether she understood the implication of handing 
over the child upon birth. 
 36  Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgment. 
surrogate ’ s right to security in and control over her body. Hence, the judge 
interpreted her mandate to include a discretionary power to condone the late 
submission of the agreement, for the most part inspired by the best interests 
of the child whose birth was imminent. It is widely thought, though, that the 
judgment involved considerable stretching of legal principle to arrive at the 
desired result. 
 4. ELIGIBILITY FOR SURROGACY 
 4.1.  ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR WOMEN ACTING 
AS A SURROGATE 
 Section 295 spells out the eligibility criteria for women desiring to act as a 
surrogate. Th ese are: that she is competent to enter into the agreement; that she 
is in all respects suitable to act as a surrogate mother; that she understands and 
accepts the legal consequences of entering into an agreement in terms of this 
Act; that she is not using surrogacy as a source of income and that she is entering 
into the contract for altruistic reasons; that she has a documented history of at 
least one pregnancy and viable delivery; and that she has a living child of her 
own.  Ex Parte WH confi rmed that a court will require a proper psycho-social 
report relating to the surrogate to be attached to the papers. 
 A recent case did illustrate the willingness of the court to probe the 
suitability of would-be surrogates with some diligence. In  Ex Parte K , 34 the 
court raised as a matter of concern (inter alia) that the prospective surrogate 
was only 20 years old, that she had met her husband (the fourth applicant) 
when she was only 13 years old, had had her first child at 16, whereupon she 
dropped out of school prematurely. She had another child two years later. The 
court was concerned that, as regards her psycho-social status, she did not 
appear to have made good decisions in her best interests as a teenager, and that 
there was nothing in the papers to indicate that she had gained the maturity 
to understand the implications of her decisions. 35 For this, and other reasons 
discussed below, the court did not find her suitable to serve as a surrogate 
mother. 36 
 Although there is no explicit age (upper or lower), one website of a local 
clinic involved in surrogacy requires the surrogate to be no older than 42 years 
of age. 
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 37  Ex Parte CJD and others (Centre for Child Law intervening as amicus curiae ) ( case no. 53131/2017 , 
North Gauteng High Court). 
 38  Th e third and fourth applicants are the potential surrogate and her partner. 
 39  Paragraph 4 of the (as yet unreported) judgment. 
 4.2. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR COMMISSIONING PARENTS 
 As mentioned, according to s. 295, the commissioning parents must be unable 
to give birth to a child, and that condition must be permanent and irreversible. 
Th ey must be competent to enter into the agreement, be in all respects suitable 
to accept the parenthood of the child that is to be conceived; and understand 
and accept the legal consequences of the agreement to be confi rmed. Case law 
has confi rmed that medical supporting evidence of the pregnancy or conception 
infertility of the would-be commissioning parents must be provided (unless the 
commissioning parent is single or a same-sex (male) couple). 
 Th e issue of age(s) of the commissioning parents has not surfaced  eo nomine , 
although there were informal concerns raised by child rights advocates at the 
time of the  AB decision that the principal applicant was already in her late 
fi ft ies by the time of the application for a declaration of constitutional invalidity 
which, if successful, would have paved the way for her to enter into a surrogate 
motherhood agreement. 
 4.3.  ROLE OF THE CHILD ’ S BEST INTERESTS IN ASSESSING 
ELIGIBILITY 
 A potentially controversial judgment was recently handed down by the High 
Court in Pretoria. 37 Two men seeking confi rmation of a surrogacy agreement 
were unsuccessful. It came to the attention of the judge before whom the matter 
served that the second applicant, HN, did not want his sexual orientation made 
public and that he and partner CJD do not live together. 38 Th e court noted that 
his need to be discreet about his sexual orientation was occasioned by his career 
as a medical specialist, as rumours about his sexual orientation had in the past 
impacted negatively on his practice. However, the court raised this as a fl ag with 
potential consequences for the child ’ s best interests: 
 ‘ Th e questions that need to be considered by the Court is how the fact that the parties 
do not live together, and how the fact that HN does not want his sexual orientation to 
be made public will impact on the best interest of the child. It is of no importance at all 
that CJD and HN are homosexual, the fact however is that the specifi c situation may 




 40  Ex parte WH  2011  (6) SA 514 at 517 para. 4:  ‘ Children occupy a special place in the cultural, 
social and legal arrangement so most societies. Th at this is so is understandable in recognition 
of both the vulnerability of children and the almost instinctive need to advance their well-
being and ensure their protection, as well as the compelling human and social imperative to 
pursue and further their best interests  … ’ . 
 41  Paragraph 18 of the unreported judgment. 
 42  Paragraph 21. 
 43  Section 231(1) of the Children ’ s Act. 
 Th e fact that the parties wanted to be discreet about their private life, according 
to the court, did not extend to being discreet about their role(s) as parents of 
a child born of a surrogacy agreement. Th e court provided examples of such 
possible impact: an excited toddler running to his father in a public place 
shouting  ‘ Daddy Daddy ’  – would the father then pretend not to be a parent ? 
What will they tell kindergarten and teachers about who the parents are ? Who 
would attend parent days at school ? 
 Citing the requirement that the court must have as uppermost the best 
interests of the child or children to be born from the surrogacy agreement, 40 
the court opined that however wide the Act is in permitting persons involved 
in diff erent (permanent) family type relationships to qualify for confi rmation 
of a surrogacy agreement, the court will still have to determine whether the 
way that the permanent relationship is structured will be supportive of raising 
a family. 41 Th e court found it diffi  cult to conceptualise of a family unit when 
it is clear from the start that the commissioning parents would not be living 
together and sharing a household. 42 By way of analogy, the court cited those 
instances where the legislation permits joint adoption, 43 noting that there must 
be a joint household with shared rights and responsibilities, according to the 
intention of the legislature. In this application, the applicants did not explain 
how they will operate as a family unit, whilst not sharing a household. Stressing 
that the judgment did not preclude an application by one partner as prospective 
commissioning parent, or a joint application if the second applicant were to be 
more open about his sexual orientation and status in the relationship, in future, 
the best interests of the child (to be born) resulted in the court refusing to 
confi rm the application. 
 5. TRANSFERRING PARENTHOOD 
 5.1. LEGAL PROCESS 
 Due to the a priori  legislative determination of the allocation of legal parental 
status once a surrogacy agreement has been confi rmed by a High Court (as 
discussed in Section 3 above), there is no post-birth transfer of parenthood, as is 
the case in other jurisdictions. 
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 44  Paragraph 66. 
 45  Unreported case no. 45037/16. 
 5.2. RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 
 Section 41 of the Children ’ s Act makes provision for a child born as a result 
of surrogacy, or the guardian of that child, to have access to any medical 
information or other information concerning the child ’ s genetic parent(s) aft er 
the child reaches the age of 18 years. Th is is consistent with the object of s. 294 
to ensure that the child becomes aware of its genetic origin. Th is is so even if 
the provision does not allow access to information regarding the identity of the 
surrogate mother in terms of s. 41(2) ( AB para. 254). 
 6. AGENCIES AND CRIMINALISATION 
 Th e involvement of agencies surfaced in the fi rst reported case aft er the coming 
into operation of the Children ’ s Act,  Ex parte WH , where the court was at pains 
to emphasise that the involvement of agencies raised the real risk of  ‘ wombs for 
hire ’ and unauthorised payments passing between commissioning parents and 
agency, or agency and surrogate. Th e court then stressed that only payments 
authorised by the Act are permitted. Section 301 lists these as follows: claims 
directly related to the artifi cial fertilisation and pregnancy and birth of the child; 
expenses related to the confi rmation of the surrogacy agreement itself; loss of 
earnings suff ered by the surrogate in consequence of the surrogacy agreement; 
insurance for the surrogate mother to cover for death or disability; and bona fi de 
professional medical or legal services. 
 Th e court required, further, when an agency was involved in the surrogacy 
arrangement, for the following additional documents to be submitted with the 
papers: the business of the agency; whether any form of payment is being paid 
to or by the agency for any aspect of the surrogacy; what exactly the agencies 
involvement was regarding: (i) the introduction of the surrogate mother; (ii) how 
the information regarding the surrogate mother was obtained by the agency; 
(iii) whether the surrogate mother received any compensation at all from the 
agency or from the commissioning parents. 44 
 In a recent matter,  Ex parte HPP , 45 the court noticed that a particular person 
was to act as a so-called surrogacy coordinator providing  ‘ surrogacy facilitation 
services ’. Th is raised the question as to whether s. 301 of the Children ’ s Act was 
being contravened by the submission of a contract (between the parties and 
the surrogacy coordinator), and whether the court could confi rm a surrogacy 
agreement if it found that the agreement between the parties and the coordinator 




 46  In  WH , the surrogates were introduced to the commissioning parents by an egg donation 
agency, free of charge. 
 Upon inquiry as to what this service entailed, and whether it was to be paid 
for, the court established that it included: guiding and advising the surrogate; 
a referral to a clinical psychologist; assisting with any mediation with the 
surrogate, if applicable, during the gestational period; if required, to manage 
any dispute resolution; in general, to oversee the entire surrogacy  ‘ journey ’. An 
amount of R5,000 was to be invoiced for this service, which the applicants were 
happy to pay. It was explicit that no fee would be earned for introducing the 
surrogate to the intended parents. 
 Th e court, having noted the interests of the surrogacy facilitator, advised 
her of its intention to declare the agreement between herself and the applicants 
unlawful, so that she could fi le an affi  davit. She responded that she had been 
off ered full-time employment by a fertility clinic as a surrogacy coordinator, 
which she accepted. 
 She explained that she herself had acted as a surrogate six times in the past 
11 years, and was uniquely placed to provide support services to surrogates; she 
added that her services included off ering round-the-clock emotional support, 
running a surrogacy support group, and monitoring the surrogate throughout 
the process. Th is includes reminders to the surrogate to take her medication, 
explaining complicated doctors ’ reports to the surrogate, and preparing the 
surrogate emotionally for medical procedures. 
 On evaluation of this supplementary evidence, the court was not convinced 
that her services do not encroach on legal, medical and psychological terrains. 
Moreover, the court emphasised, that, like it or not, commercial surrogacy 
was prohibited in South Africa, and that s. 301 reinforces that only prescribed 
payments are permitted, on pain of criminal sanction. Payments of introductory 
fees to facilitate the link between commissioning parents and a potential surrogate 
are specifi cally prohibited (and the surrogacy coordinator categorically stated 
that she did not levy a fee for services other than those authorised by the Act or 
to persons other than authorised by the Act), are prohibited and any affi  davit 
founding an application for confi rmation must state this fact. 46 
 Th e applicant ’ s lawyer argued that the facilitator ’ s fee fell within the ambit of 
s. 301 exceptions, on the basis that they were expenses  ‘ related to the artifi cial 
fertilisation and pregnancy ’ or those  ‘ related to the birth of the child ’. Th e 
court dismissed this, stating that invaluable though her services might be, they 
are not authorised by the Act and therefore the agreements between her and 
the commissioning parents were declared unlawful and unenforceable. Th e 
primary concern of the court was the possibility of commercial surrogacy being 
furthered through the back door, particularly that fees will be charged de facto 
for recruiting surrogates and introducing them to commissioning parents. 
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 As to the impact of an illegal collateral agreement upon the surrogate 
motherhood agreement, the court held that there was no danger that the rights 
of the unborn child would be aff ected, as the fertilisation process had not yet 
commenced. Th e rights of the commissioning parents would be impinged only 
to a limited extent as they could still enter into another surrogacy agreement 
which was not aff ected by a tainted collateral agreement. Th e court had a 
discretion according to applicable contract law to establish whether the unlawful 
contract had tainted the lawful contract to the extent that the lawful contract 
cannot be endorsed. Th e surrounding circumstances in this case having been 
briefl y perused, including the fact that the applicants were unaware of the 
possible illegality of a facilitation agreement, the court confi rmed the surrogate 
motherhood agreement sans the collateral illegal agreement. 
 In  Ex parte K , 47 the court expressed grave concern about the purportedly 
altruistic nature of the surrogate ’ s willingness to act as such. She came seemingly 
from poor socio-economic circumstances, and had no other income. Th e 
municipal rates bill for the property where she lived with extended family 
members was deeply in arrears. Th e surrogate and her husband had not provided 
a full statement of assets and liabilities to the court. She was to receive a fl at fee 
of R4,000 (US $ 340) per month to start with, escalating to R6,000 (US $ 500) per 
month once a pregnancy was confi rmed (for her to hire a domestic worker to 
assist with the extra burden of the pregnancy and her own two small children). 
Noting that the court in  WH had specifi cally discouraged the payment of generic 
amounts, the court said it was not convinced that these amounts (of R4,000 and 
R6,000) were justifi ed, as insuffi  cient information had been placed before the 
court to warrant that the prospective surrogate mother was not using surrogacy 
as a form of income. Th e contract was not confi rmed. 
 Th e court also commented adversely on some other aspects of third-party 
involvement in this surrogacy arrangement. Th e court noted that the surrogate 
and commissioning parents were introduced to one another by a clinic which 
operates an internal surrogacy programme. Th ey also off er other services; the 
assessment report refl ects that the psychologist had an offi  ce based at the same 
premises as the clinic; the same psychologist compiled the reports for both the 
surrogate and the commissioning parents; it also appeared that the same medical 
doctor who would undertake the artifi cial fertilisation was also responsible for 
compiling the reproductive medical reports. His address also was the same as 
that of the clinic. No information was provided to the court as to whether these 
complementary services were paid for by any of the parties or not. Further, if they 
were paid for, this might hamper the objectivity of the professional assessment. 
Given that it was found that it was unlikely that the potential surrogate in this 




 48  At para. 27. SMA is the abbreviation for surrogate motherhood agreement. 
 49  J. Heaton , above n. 6, p. 32. 
 50  For this reason, the Children ’ s Act established a Register of Adoptable Children and 
Prospective Adoptive Parents, to enable domestic matching to occur: s. 232. 
 51  J. Heaton , above n. 6, p. 40. 
court said  ‘ this points for the need for medico-legal experts involved in the 
surrogacy process to be impartial in perception and in fact, given the assistance 
they off er to the Court in this regard. Th ey owe their allegiance to the Court and 
not to the parties to the SMA. ’ 48 
 In the premise, the court was not satisfi ed about the non-disclosure of the 
relationship between the medico-legal professionals and the clinic, such that the 
risk of a commercial surrogacy could be eliminated. 
 7. INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
 Th e terrain of international surrogacy relative to South Africa is at once simple 
and complicated. As pointed out, the starting point is that unless authorised by a 
court in the case of an intended surrogate, the parties must be domiciled in South 
Africa. Domicile is a legal concept, and is not equatable to habitual residence. 
It can be established quite quickly, provided that the requisite intention to 
establish a domicile is in place. Th e  WH case, as mentioned, involved a Dutch 
and a Danish national, who did aver that their domicile was South Africa, 
though this has been disputed in academic circles, who have raised the spectre 
of international surrogacy tourism. 49 A surrogacy agreement concluded by 
foreign nationals who are not domiciled in South Africa would be invalid and 
unenforceable, regardless of whether the surrogacy is altruistic or commercial. 
Th e commissioning parents would acquire no rights in respect of the surrogate-
born child, and would also likely be ineligible for adoption, given the requirements 
of s. 25 of the Children ’ s Act which foresees such applications as being treated as 
inter-country adoptions, which must be dealt with in accordance with the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption (1993), which South Africa has ratifi ed. 
Satisfying Hague Convention requirements include the principle of subsidiarity, 
meaning that no suitable domestic adoption possibilities exist. 50 
 Th e position of a South African engaging in surrogacy abroad is murky. Th e 
law does not prohibit South Africans from engaging in surrogacy abroad. Th ere 
would be little reason for them to do so, since altruistic surrogacy is legal, unless 
they lacked or did not want to donate their own gametes, or preferred medical 
services off ered elsewhere. 51 Th eir legal parentage status could be uncertain, and 
if commercial surrogacy was at stake, the public policy exception of common law 
might result in South African courts declining to recognise the legal tie between 
the commissioning parents and the child. Recently, an enquiry regarding 
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 52  K. Ozah , presentation at the Miller du Toit Cloete/University of the Western Cape 
21st conference on child and family law, Cape Town 02.03.2018 (copy on fi le with the author). 
 53  Personal communication wth a lawyer representing the South African mother in court 
proceedings being pursued in the United Kingdom for the return of the children on 
25 September 2018. 
 54  As has been done in the Regulations to the Children ’ s Act prescribing payments for 
intercountry adoption. 
parentage was received by a child rights advocacy clinic regarding twins born 
to a South African mother arising from a surrogacy agreement concluded and 
fulfi lled abroad. Upon her return to South Africa, she died, and an uncle, based 
in South Africa, was exploring the possibility of formalising his parentage status 
in respect of the two children. Th e matter is yet to be resolved. 52 
 Th e  HPP case discussed above records that the surrogacy coordinator 
advertised her services on a website and off ered services to national and 
international clients. Th is included providing for intended parents living out of 
state, and personal consultation with the surrogate via home visits. Th is position 
is potentially illegal in view of the prohibition on payments being received for 
surrogacy services in s. 301, subject to the exceptions provided for therein. 
Recently, an anecdotal report surfaced of commissioning parents based in the 
United Kingdom who have two children born of a South African surrogate. 
Since there are additional concerns relating to the legality of the alleged court 
approval, the matter is being investigated. 53 
 8. CONCLUSION 
 Th ere is an evident need to foster better oversight over surrogacy as a whole 
in South Africa. As matters stand at present, the reliance has been exclusively 
placed on the judiciary to exercise oversight and ensure that the intention 
of the legislature, especially to prevent commercial surrogacy, is upheld. Th e 
cases discussed in this chapter show that, as far as can be ascertained, many 
judges are performing an excellent job in delving into the details of surrogate 
motherhood agreements coming before them for confi rmation. However, 
too little information exists about the overall picture: how many surrogacy 
agreements are being concluded in the country as a whole ? What is the overall 
profi le of surrogate mothers ? How are the actual payments to surrogate mothers 
and others (lawyers, clinics) being monitored ? 
 It is therefore proposed that two solutions would improve the surrogacy 
situation in South Africa: fi rst, the enactment of regulations to the principal 
law contained in the Children ’ s Act, to spell out in more detail the criteria that 
the courts are developing related to (for instance) eligibility of surrogates and 
commissioning parents, authorised payments and the benchmark amounts, 54 




 55  Presentation by an obstetrician at a conference on surrogacy in October 2015, Stellenbosch 
University Faculty of Law. He acknowledged having birthed more than 3,000 surrogate-born 
babies over the course of his career. 
 56  Although the Children ’ s Act does prescribe that the identities of the commissioning parent, 
the surrogate, and the surrogate-born child may not be made public: s. 302. 
 Second, there appears to be a need for a central authority to collate information 
and monitor developments. Such agency would have to be established under 
one or another legal regime, in order for it to have the necessary powers and 
functions (e.g. to require reporting by fertility clinics and other role players, to 
investigate cases of potential malpractice and so forth). 
 South Africa ’ s history of surrogacy is not a recent one: even prior to the 
enactment of legislation in 2010, clinics had been performing surrogacy services 
for some 30 years. 55 However, with the advent of the Children ’ s Act, surrogacy is 
much more in the public domain, 56 and subject to judicial scrutiny. 

